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Risk Sharing and Transactions Costs in 
Producer-Processor Supply Chains
by Allan W. Gray and Michael D. Boehlje
Introduction
Several forces are converging to encourage the agricultural
industry to form more tightly aligned supply chains. Effi-
ciency, synergies, inter-firm pooling of resources, customer
responsiveness, and risk sharing are the four key objectives
that firms seek to improve by forming such chains
(Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000). Efficiencies are
often gained by more accurately sharing information
between parties in the chain. For example, a pork proces-
s o r  m a y  b e  a b l e  t o  m a n a g e  t h e  f l o w  s c h e d u l e  o f  h o g s
through the slaughter plant by contracting or even owning
the production stage of the pork chain. And complemen-
tary inter-firm synergies resulting from, for example, alli-
ances between research and development (R&D) and
manufacturing firms and downstream distribution and
marketing firms can also be captured with effective supply
chains.
Responsiveness to consumer demand is another reason
for developing supply chains. Products that can be differ-
entiated at various stages of the food chain allow for the
potential to meet the demands of certain segments of the
market. Retailers as well as processors argue that their sup-
ply chains allow them to respond to an ever changing set
of consumer preferences more quickly than they could
with traditional open-market transactions.
In addition to efficiency, inter-firm synergy, and
responsiveness, supply chain participants often express a
desire to manage risks as a reason for forming supply
chains. The risks may be input/output price risk, quantity/
quality risks, and/or safety/health risks. The recent interest
in food safety and traceability are often cited as reasons for
forming tighter vertical alliances. Agricultural producers
often state that reductions in price and volume variability
are key influencers in their decision to join a supply chain
(Hennessey & Lawrence, 1999; Rhoades, 1995).
Supply chains have been a dominant focus of both aca-
demic research and business strategy in the food and agri-
business industries for the past decade. Much discussion,
analysis, and experimentation with various forms of verti-
cal alignment using governance structures such as strategic
alliances, joint ventures, contracts, and vertical integration
has occurred. Much of the recent debate and discussion, as
well as the controversy concerning the development of
these arrangements has focused on the production sector,
and in particular, the linkages between producers and pro-
cessors. 
The effectiveness and long-term viability of a supply
chain is determined in no small part by how well the coor-
dination governance structure manages the sharing of the
risks and rewards of the supply chain among its partici-
pants. The different types of risks encountered in alterna-
tive supply chain business structures, the incidence of risk
on the part of individual supply chain partners and the
sharing of risk and reward among supply chain partici-
pants has important implications for who will be the most
likely participants in a supply chain, as well as the benefits
the various players will receive. 
Risk Sharing and Costs of Vertical Alignment
The research on supply chain risk/reward sharing in agri-
culture has often been focused on producer impacts. As
noted, producers are often seeking avoidance of risk in
these arrangements. However, governance structures such
as contracting that lead to risk avoidance also result in
lower returns on average. Governance structures that
reduce risks for producers can lead to misalignment of
incentives resulting in shirking behavior (moral hazard) if
not monitored carefully. For example, producers on fixed
payment contracts may be more inclined to deliver lighter
weight hogs to the slaughter facility than the processor
desires. In addition, governance structures that reduce282 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2005 • 20(4)
risks for producers can attract pro-
ducers that are relatively more risk
averse (adverse selection). This risk
averse nature often manifests itself in
less aggressive adoption of new tech-
nologies and business practices –
behaviors that do not enable a value
chain to reap full benefits of effi-
ciency and productivity improve-
ments over time. Thus, channel part-
n e r s  t h a t  a b s o r b  m o r e  r i s k  i n  t h e i r
agreement with producers generally
expect and receive higher returns to
compensate for the higher risk and/
or risk mitigation costs.
For some firms, the risk sharing
transactions cost of monitoring chan-
nel partners exceeds the willingness
of the marketplace to compensate
them.  In these cases, the firm may
choose to acquire the chain (verti-
cally integrate), thereby avoiding the
transactions costs associated with
moral hazard and adverse selection.
These firms have decided that the
internal transactions costs associated
with owning both stages of the chain
(agency costs, influence costs,
increased production risks, employee
risks, etc.) are less than the external
transactions costs (moral hazard,
adverse selection, and risk premia).
Smithfield Foods and Tyson Foods
offer examples where vertical owner-
ship has been the preferred choice in
an industry where other governance
structures continue to be employed.
These two firms, with their interna-
tional brand identity and diverse
product bases, may be in a position
where the transactions costs of open-
market, contract, or joint venture
agreements exceed their internal
transactions costs of owning the
chain.
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual
framework of external transactions
costs of risk sharing in comparison to
internal transactions costs of owner-
ship. The vertical axis measures the
total cost of the transactions of prod-
ucts, services, information, and com-
pensation between stages of the
chain.  The horizontal axis represents
the risk aversion and/or ability to
manage risk for producers from
whom the processor may choose to
acquire products. The processor is
assumed to have a lower relative risk
aversion than producers. Thus, as
channel captain, if the processor
wants to source products from more
risk averse producers, they must
design vertical arrangements to either
take on more of the risk, or compen-
sate the risk averse producers more
for accepting the same share of the
risk.
Two separate lines are displayed
in Figure 1. The external transactions
costs line reflects the additional risk-
sharing cost borne by the processor
when the exchange is between the
processor and producers in a vertical
arrangement. This line increases at an
increasing rate as producer risk aver-
sion increases. Increasing external
transactions costs reflect the addi-
tional costs that must be borne by the
processor in the form of either
increased risk taking or increased
compensation to the more risk averse
producer for taking on more risk. 
The internal transactions costs
line reflects the cost of ownership to a
processor that owns both stages of
the chain where separate firms are
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for external transactions costs of risk sharing versus the internal transactions costs of vertical
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replaced with employees. Internal
transactions costs of ownership are
initially assumed to be higher than
external transactions costs. That is,
we assume that the efficiencies of an
open-market transaction in the
absence of risk aversion by the pro-
ducer result in lower transactions
costs than vertical ownership. 
As producer risk aversion
increases, the internal transactions
costs of ownership do not change --
only the risk sharing transactions
costs of a market-based exchange
increase. There is a point where the
additional transactions costs of risk
sharing cause the transactions costs of
the market exchange to exceed the
internal transactions costs of owner-
ship. 
The delineations across the top of
the figure illustrate the different gov-
ernance structures likely to be
employed. When producers have risk
management capabilities or have low
enough risk aversion that risk sharing
transactions costs are low, channel
partners are likely to align in an
arms-length exchange such as open
markets, strategic alliances, or joint
ventures. As producer risk aversion
rises or management ability declines,
the external transactions costs rise for
the processor due to increased risk
sharing costs. The increase in exter-
nal transactions costs lead to more
formal vertical arrangements such as
contracts, where the risks and returns
are dictated by the channel captain
(processor).  There is a point along
the producers’ risk aversion/manage-
ment scale where the risk sharing
transactions cost of the market
exchange are higher than the internal
transactions costs of owning the
c h a i n .  I t  i s  a t  o r  j u s t  b e y o n d  t h i s
point where ownership of the chan-
nel (vertical integration) becomes an
option because the transactions costs
of risk sharing exceed the internal
transactions costs of ownership.  Pro-
ducers at this level of risk aversion
would likely choose to become a
grower for a vertically integrated
firm, receiving a flat fee for their ser-
vices much like an employee of the
company.
Research in supply chains in
other industries shows that eventually
external transactions costs decline
below the internal transactions costs
of chain ownership as firms become
more accustomed to working
together and better equipped to han-
dle the risks in the exchange between
segments of the chain (a learning
supply chain as described by Sporle-
der & Peterson, 2003). If the goal is
to reduce external transactions costs,
then firms will favor partners that are
less risk averse or better able to man-
age risk. As such, contracts and simi-
lar vertical arrangements would likely
accrue to larger producers. However,
for processors willing to absorb more
risk, the preferred partner may be
more risk averse producers in very
tightly linked production contracts,
where producer risks are transferred
to the processor but rewards to the
producer are lower. The framework
presented here ignores any concept of
market power among channel partic-
ipants, and yet illustrates a logical
economic reason for more tightly
aligned vertical arrangements and
industry consolidation to occur even
in the absence of market power.
Risk Premiums and Contract 
Production
A common governance structure that
more explicitly shares risks and
rewards between supply chain part-
ners is the contract. Figure 2 illus-
trates the nature of the risk premium
required to entice more risk averse
producers into contract arrangements
that share more risk. The horizontal
Figure 2. Risk/reward sharing between the processor and producers at various risk aversion levels.284 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2005 • 20(4)
axis is the proportion of returns
shared by producers in a vertical
arrangement with a processor. The
vertical axis is the risk shared by the
producer. There are three lines in the
graph, each representing different
levels of producer risk aversion. If the
producer and the processor were both
risk neutral, then the sharing of risk
and reward would be illustrated by
the 45 degree line. If the risk-neutral
processor wishes to maintain this
same level of risk sharing, but must
do so with more risk averse produc-
ers, the processor will have to give a
greater share of the rewards to the
producer — a risk premium required
by the producer. And the greater the
producer’s risk aversion, the more
sizeable the risk premium becomes.
To minimize this risk premium pay-
ment, the processor would prefer to
contract with producers who are less
risk averse or have more capacity to
manage or absorb risk; this motiva-
tion again favors larger producers. 
Contracts frequently spell out
portions of both “fixed” payments
and incentive payments from buyers
to suppliers based on performance
variables. The balance of fixed versus
incentive payments depends, ulti-
mately, on the relative risk aversion/
management capability of the part-
ners in the chain. If a processor seeks
a governance structure that allows the
risks to be shared between the parties,
then they will seek a governance
structure with more incentive pay-
ments. To entice risk averse produc-
ers to accept more incentive pay-
ments (share more of the risk), the
fixed payment would have to be
greater than for less risk averse pro-
ducers (this is reflected in Figure 2 as
the risk premium).1 The risk sharing
transactions cost of governance struc-
tures with more incentive payments
will be less if the producers are rela-
tively less risk averse or relatively
more capable of managing risk. This
again suggests that agribusinesses
seeking production partners in a con-
tract-coordinated supply chain that
will share the risks and rewards will
tend to favor larger producers with
the ability to spread risk and/or pro-
ducers that are less risk averse. For
processors that are more willing and/
or able to manage risk, a fixed pay-
ment contract may be the preferred
arrangement to attract risk averse
producers that are willing to take less
return for lower risk. 
Implications for Producer 
Financial Performance
The transfer of risk and the accompa-
nying reward from supplier (pro-
ducer) to buyer (processor) suggests
that suppliers will likely be less prof-
itable under a vertically aligned gov-
ernance structure compared to the
traditional open-market governance
structure that has dominated agricul-
ture. And in fact most studies sup-
port this argument when profitability
is measured by traditional metrics
such as profit per unit of production
or return on assets (ROA). But verti-
cal arrangements that share business
risk and rewards allow producers to
access more debt capital if the busi-
ness risk is reduced through contract-
ing or similar business arrangements.
Analysis of pork contracting illus-
trates the financial implications of
using more debt in the capital struc-
ture of the contract production farm
compared to an independent grower.
Contract swine growers can in fact
finance their operations with debt
comprising a large portion of their
capital structure (Lins, 1997; Roberts
et al., 1997). Table 1 illustrates the
implications of different capital
structures for different business
arrangements on the return on equity
(ROE). Note that with no debt,
independent business arrangements
generate a higher ROE (and ROA
since they are equal when no debt is
used) than the typical contract busi-
ness arrangements analyzed. As debt
becomes a larger proportion of the
capital structure of the business, the
ROE increases for all business
arrangements. But the independent
grower who does not manage operat-
ing risk will likely not be able to use
as much debt as part of his/her capi-
tal structure as the contract grower.
Comparing the ROE of the indepen-
dent grower at 40% debt (23.5%)
with that of contract growers at 80%
debt (23.1% and 27.6%), it is appar-
ent that vertically aligned systems
that transfer risk to the buyer (pro-
cessor) have equal or superior finan-
cial performance. By accessing more
external financing these firms also
have increased capacity to expand
their business. 
Increased access to debt capital
allows vertically aligned producers to
generate competitive financial perfor-
mance, grow at a more rapid pace,
and adopt new technologies more
quickly than those not vertically
aligned — further separating these
producers from those with less access
to vertical markets and debt capital.
This outcome may, again, lead to a
more rapid consolidation as well as
vertical coordination of the industry
as has been witnessed in poultry,
pork, and potato industries.
Risk of Vertical Alignment
The development of more tightly
aligned supply chains creates new
1. The discussion here is based on 
incentive contract literature and 
more explicitly from the discussion 
of the “Second-Best” Contract by 
Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 
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and less easily quantifiable risks for
the participants in the supply chain.
For example, one of the supply chain
risks faced by both suppliers and
buyers is contractual or relationship
risks. A grower may have a contract
that guarantees a price for his/her
products, and enticements to invest
in specific assets, but what happens if
the processor goes bankrupt? What
happens to the contract (availability
or terms) and the capital investments
made by the produer next year if the
processor finds other suppliers in
other areas who can satisfy their
needs at a lower price? This risk is
not unlike that of losing a critical
supplier or a lender, but losing access
to the product market has typically
not been a significant risk for pro-
ducers in commodity-based agricul-
ture.
The adoption of more tightly
aligned supply chains in agriculture is
likely to compound the risk and
uncertainty related to the effective-
ness of markets in providing accurate
messages to consumers and suppliers
in the food chain concerning prices,
quantities, and qualities of products
and attributes. With the formation of
more tightly aligned food supply
chains, it can be argued that messag-
ing is much more precise, timely, and
generally more accurate for partici-
pants in the chain than might be pro-
vided by market forms of coordina-
tion. But, what about the risk faced
by those who are not part of the
tightly aligned supply chain – are not
qualified suppliers? Is there more vol-
atility in the prices they receive
because of thin markets? Do they
have access to a market or are they
closed out because only qualified
suppliers can participate? Because of
the thinness of these markets, are
they not only subject to more volatil-
ity, but also more potential for
manipulation? Do the prices and
other information conveyed by these
thin markets provide accurate mes-
sages to consumers and suppliers
concerning quantities, qualities, cost,
and value? 
Conclusions
Tightly aligned supply chains are
forming at a rapid pace in the agri-
cultural section. Traditional transac-
tions costs are a critical determinant
of the appropriate governance struc-
ture for these supply chains. How-
ever, risk considerations and the risk
aversion/sharing characteristics of the
players are also important. The
search for reduced risk sharing trans-
actions cost leads to the formation of
supply chains among participants
that are more willing to share risks as
well as rewards. More specifically,
strategies to reduce internal/external
transactions costs lead to the forma-
tion of supply chains among partici-
pants who are less risk averse or have
more ability to manage or mitigate
risk. This suggests that, in general,
most tightly aligned supply chains
that seek to share risk and rewards
among participants will be increas-
ingly dominated by larger firms at
both the buyer and supplier level –
leading to more consolidation, par-
ticularly at the production end of
those industries. However, channel
captains that have the willingness and
ability to absorb the risk may allow
producers with less ability to manage
risk to maintain a role in the industry
as service providers for these risk
absorbing processors. At the same
time, the transformation of the
industry to more tightly aligned sup-
ply chains will introduce new strate-
gic risks which will require additional
analysis and skills to manage and/or
mitigate those risks. 
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